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 ABSTRACT 
 
Romanticized visions of Khalistan became emotively embedded in the hearts and 
minds of Sikh-Canadians following the execution of Operation Blue Star. Today, 
insurgents residing within the contested homeland continue to draw support from Sikh 
immigrants and their Canadian-born descendants. Perplexingly, while a sizable 
proportion of second and third-generation Sikh youth advocate for the creation of the 
theocratic state of Khalistan, many selectively disregard the righteous way of life 
envisioned by the founders of the Khalsa Panth. This paper presents a conceptual 
sociological analysis of the diasporic politics of identity and homeland. Although 
Marx, and other modern social theorists, had presumed that nationalism would 
eventually disappear, globalization has attributed new importance to the project of 
nation-building, and imagined political communities. Using the Sikh nationalist 
liberation movement as the point of departure, this paper demonstrates that ethno-racial 
markers of identity, and primordial religious mythologies, can be politically employed 
to distract members of oppressed groups from realizing the material conditions which 
perpetuate inequality in post-colonial capitalist states. Considering that ethnies are 
never universally homogenous groups, and that economic incentives exist for seizing 
state power, nationalist movements can only be understood by identifying the concrete 
class interests of their principal exponents. While the Punjab problem represents the 
empirical focus of this paper, the rich sociological insights on inter-communal conflict, 
identity, and belonging are generalizable beyond this immediate context. 
 
Keywords: Khalistan, Sikhism, Punjab, Canada, diaspora, immigration, nationalism, 
identity, identity politics, primordialism, ethnicity, race, caste, social class, class 
consciousness, false consciousness, ideology, hegemony, social control 
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INTRODUCTON:  
At the founding convention of the World Sikh Organization (WSO) in 1984, 
Ajaib Singh Bagri vehemently declared: 
The destiny of communities is changed when the blood of 
martyrs is spilled… I give you my most solemn assurance, 
until we kill 50,000 Hindus we will not rest… the Khalsa 
have to clash iron with iron… if anybody tries to get our 
nation annihilated, all of his family and children will be 
reduced to pulp (Quoted in Duthel, 2014: 484; emphasis 
added). 
The intoxicating amalgamation of propaganda and scripture espoused by the 
orthodox preacher aroused the long-dormant nationalist sentiments of the Sikh diaspora 
(Bell, 2007: 23). Aspirations for the theocratic homeland of Khalistan (the land of the 
pure) had initially emerged in Punjab (the land of five rivers) during the abdication of 
British colonial rule. However, the struggle for Sikh self-determination was first formally 
pursued within the legal confines of India’s political-economic system. Under the post-
colonial state, the Sikhs’ campaign for independence proved to be ineffective due to 
pervasive communal bias in the allocation of social, political, and economic resources 
which emanated from the central government’s tacit adherence to Hindutva nationalist 
ideology.  
Within the ‘socialist’, ‘secular’, and ‘democratic’ Indian Republic, the historical 
grievances of the Sikhs, and other marginalized ethno-religious groups, were 
purposefully disregarded since they were inconsistent with the national politics of 
dynastic succession, and the transnational priorities of the post-independence period. 
While communal calls to arms resonated with Sikhs residing in the contested homeland, 
they also appealed to members of the diaspora who were physically separated, but still 
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emotionally tied to the region of Punjab. The latter group of Sikhs, who had ventured  
beyond the land of five rivers, were forced to painfully sever their nationalist loyalties to 
Bharat Mata (Mother India) when televised news coverage of the desecration of the 
Harmandir Sahib complex was finally broadcasted. State-sanctioned religious persecution 
facilitated the intensification of Khalistani ethno-nationalism in Punjab, while also 
serving as the explosive catalyst for the deadliest terrorist attack recorded in Canadian 
history.  
The violent secessionist movement continues to draw moral, ideological, and 
economic support from Sikh immigrants and their Canadian-born descendants. Today, 
romanticized visions of the ‘land of the pure’ have become emotively embedded in the 
hearts and minds of many second and third-generation diasporic youth. Perplexingly, 
while newer generations of Canadian-Sikhs support the imagined theocratic state of 
Khalistan, they selectively disregard the righteous way of life envisioned by the founders 
of the Khalsa Panth (pure faith), and dismiss the spiritual guidance proffered in the Adi 
Granth (Sikh holy book). This paper presents a conceptual analysis of the diasporic 
politics of identity and homeland. Although the Punjab problem represents the empirical 
focus of this paper, the rich sociological insights on inter-communal conflict, identity, 
and belonging are generalizable beyond this immediate context.  
Using the Sikh nationalist liberation movement as the point of departure, this 
paper will demonstrate that ethno-racial markers of identity, and primordial religious 
mythologies, can be politically employed to distract members of oppressed groups from 
realizing the material conditions which perpetuate inequality in post-colonial societies. 
Considering that ethnies are never universally homogenous groups, and that economic 
incentives exist for seizing state power, nationalist movements can only be understood by 
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identifying the concrete class interests of their principal exponents (Allahar, 2008: 1). 
The homeland struggle of the imagined Sikh community is rooted in stark class, and 
caste-based, power differentials which have been generated by the political-economic 
contradictions of peripheral capitalist development. 
In the contemporary period, the grievances of marginalized populations cannot be 
resolved through regressive resegregation efforts, or secessionist movements. In the long-
term, the pervasive and problematic politics of cultural difference is unconducive to 
progressive social change, since the struggle for human emancipation is intrinsically tied 
up with a growing need for social solidarity, and collective sense of forgetfulness. Global 
social justice can only be achieved through the abolishment of private property, and the 
implementation of the proletarian dictatorship. In light of the reductionist nature of 
orthodox Marxist theory, especially its tendency to demote non-class-based inequalities 
to the status of epiphenomena, a neo-Marxist analysis will be propounded in the ensuing 
discussion. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section one outlines Marxian 
class theory while attempting to integrate considerations of caste, race, and ethnicity into 
the discourse of economic power. Section two examines the persistence of nationalism, 
and assesses the challenges posed to proletarian internationalism by globalization. 
Section three provides a synoptic pre and post-partition genealogy of the social and 
economic origins of Khalistani ethno-nationalism. Section four considers the 
contributions of diasporic Sikhs to the struggle for homeland, and addresses the politics 
of remembering and forgetting. Finally, section five draws conclusions.   
 
 
4 
 
 
SECTION I: MARXIAN CLASS THEORY 
Class and Caste Stratification: A Conceptual Distinction  
Before examining the historical circumstances surrounding the emergence of the 
Khalistani ethno-nationalist movement, and the material interests of its proponents, a 
brief discussion pertaining to social class is in order. Wright (1980: 326) succinctly 
defines classes as sets of “…common positions within the social relations of production”. 
As opposed to signifying a social grouping of individuals, or an arbitrary ranking within a 
hierarchal system of power relations, classes can be conceived of as connections which 
arise when individuals engage in interdependent economic exchanges within society 
(Morrison, 2006: 55).  
The life course trajectory of the modern social actor is profoundly shaped by 
class, since advantages, or disadvantages, are conferred on the basis of one’s relationship 
to the productive sphere. Within modern class-stratified societies like Canada, vertical 
social mobility is highly unlikely, but still theoretically possible. In contrast, within 
traditional societies like India, where elements of caste hierarchization are latently 
embedded into institutional structures and practices, movement between, and among, 
strata is impossible due to the rigidness of the system of ascribed primordial social ranks 
and statuses.  
Caste-based status differentiation is not exclusive to the Indian subcontinent, but 
the earliest expressions of this system are located within ancient Vedic scriptures (Bayly, 
1999: 23). The Rig Veda and Bhagavad Gita are replete with references to purity and 
pollution which signify that individuals of lower birth will remain constrained to the 
inferior caste position they were ascribed at birth, even if they amass material wealth, or 
attain occupational mobility (Hawley, 2011: 16). Though scheduled castes are protected 
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by the Constitution of India, many Hindus still ‘choose’ to practice endogamy so 
privilege, or disadvantage, tends to become structured intergenerationally. 
Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh faith, allegedly set out to abolish the 
oppressive Brahmanical Hindu caste system, gender inequality, and idol worship (Tatla, 
1999: 16). Nanak, the first of the nine celestial Sikh Gurus, was born into a Hindu 
Kshatriya family during a period of profound socio-political turmoil near present-day 
Lahore (Basran and Bolaria, 2004: 15). In Vedic scriptures, Kshatriyas represent the 
second echelon out of the four major caste divisions into which adherents of the Hindu 
faith are classified. The Kshatriyas were well respected in early medieval India since they 
were ordained as the armed protectors of the Hindu Samaj (community). Nevertheless, 
unlike the Brahmin priests which occupied the highest rank in the caste hierarchy, the 
Kshatriya warriors were not necessarily wealthy (Jadhav, 2007: 1). 
According to the mythological Sikh Janamsakhis (birth stories), Nanak devoted 
his life to travelling across the Indian subcontinent “…to spread the ultimate truth and to 
put mankind on the path to salvation” (Sarna, 2003: 72; emphasis added). In stark 
contrast to the Brahmin priests who denied those of lower birth entry into Hindu mandirs 
(temples), Nanak actively delivered sermons to permanently polluted populations 
(Mendelsohn and Vicziany, 1998: 7). The Guru’s divine version of ‘truth’, which was 
ideologically devoid of caste differentiation and inequality, appealed to Hindus of 
untouchable birth, as well as members of other religious denominations who were 
primordially relegated to inferior positions within the hierarchical structure of Indian 
society (Puri, 2003: 1).  
Whereas the devotees of the Sikh faith were primarily derived from the 
downtrodden, illiterate, and backward castes, Nanak, and the other nine successive 
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Gurus, originated from educated Kshatriya families (Jodhka, 2014: 586). Sikh scholars 
tend to regard Nanak as a revolutionary however, the Guru’s condemnation of the Vedic 
system of social stratification may also be interpreted as a form of political opportunism. 
Under the prevailing structural arrangements of medieval India, the Gurus only 
symbolically benefitted from their caste position. Thus, Nanak may have made a rational 
decision to reject the binary oppositions of purity and pollution, which form the 
ideological basis of Hindu caste stratification, in favour of forming a new hierarchy 
which strategically placed him in a position of divine authority.  
History evinces that inequitable power relations are often challenged by those that 
do not benefit from social structural constraints. For most devout Sikhs, this contention 
would likely be considered blasphemous since the Gurus are revered as great liberators of 
the weak, needy, and disadvantaged. Still, irrespective of the political-economic factors 
which may have contributed to Nanak denouncing the oppressive elements of the Hindu 
faith, Sikhism also functions to entrench and legitimate unequal power differentials 
between the privileged and underprivileged. While chastising and dismantling the caste 
system of Hinduism, Nanak created favourable conditions for the construction of a 
parallel primordial stratification system amongst Sikhs. 
Puri (2003: 1) notes that over time, the Sikh faith has evolved and incorporated 
elements of casteism that were similar, yet different to that of the Vedic hierarchical 
system. In the caste ordering of the Sikhs, “…Jats who own cultivable land form the 
upper echelon, artisans occupy the middle strata, while landless labourers reside at the 
bottom” (Singh and Dhanda, 2014: 501). Thus, despite the absence of caste distinction in 
scriptural ideology, the dominant Jat agriculturalists enjoy elevated status within the Sikh 
community, and commonly exercise economic power in the political institutions of 
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Indian society. Bal (2005: 3979) notes that high birth is not always a source of economic 
power since Jats, and other Sikh caste-groups, are internally fragmented with regards to 
property ownership, educational attainment, and socioeconomic position. Nevertheless, 
since the advent of globalization and the capitalist modernization of India, the caste and 
class interests of both the rural and urban Punjabi-Sikhs have slowly begun to 
complement and overlap with one another.  
The conceptual distinction between class and caste is important for the ensuing 
discussion on Sikh secessionist politics and ethno-nationalism. While the foundational 
basis of the caste system is primarily ideological, class position is determined by both 
objective material conditions, which may change in exceedingly rare circumstances, and 
a subjective awareness of one’s position within the terrain of social relations. Due to the 
stringent social enforcement of caste-based hierarchies, and their religious and cultural 
underpinnings, class-based systems of social stratification are comparatively less rigid.  
The History of Class Struggle: 
A number of theoretical paradigms have been developed to explain the 
persistence of class-based inequalities in capitalist societies, but the Marxist sociological 
framework continues to have the greatest explanatory and exhortatory strengths. 
Paradoxically, however, while class-based analyses are central to the historical materialist 
approach, Marx failed systematically to define class, and elaborate upon his usage of the 
concept (Wright, 1985: 6). Nonetheless, the general consensus among Marxists is that the 
essential determinant of an individual’s class position is ownership of the means of 
production, or lack thereof (Sirianni, 1981: 281). Ownership, or non-ownership, has 
implications for control, or exploitation, and the degree of autonomy members of a 
particular class exercise within a given society (Swingewood, 1975: 114).  
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In “The Communist Manifesto” (herein referred to as the “Manifesto”), Marx and 
Engels (1848: 1) famously asserted that “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is 
the history of class struggles". According to Marx, and his co-conspirator, successive 
transitions between historical epochs have been premised upon conflict between a 
weakening dominant class, and an emerging class vying for power (McLaverty, 2005: 
47). The highly influential political manuscript elucidates that the current form of 
capitalist socioeconomic organization is neither natural, nor immutable to structural 
transformation, since class antagonisms between the oppressors and the oppressed have 
resulted in radical changes within seemingly stable societies.  
While delineating the unstable dynamics of power relations within the dominant 
modes of production, Marx and Engels also established that class-based hierarchies have 
become more simplified over time. The “Manifesto” expounds that the profound socio-
political changes which accompanied the Enclosure Movements, and the Industrial 
Revolution, resulted in the partition of society into two opposing camps: the bourgeoisie 
and proletariat. Upon securing power from the aristocratic elites of the feudal era, and 
gaining exclusive control over the productive forces, the bourgeoisie arose as the new 
dominant class of the capitalist epoch. The agrarian peasantry was transmuted into the 
industrial proletariat following the annexation of the commons, and the institution of 
private property. 
During the feudal era, mutual obligations and loyalties had provided the 
foundational basis of social relations, as well as the system of land tenureship (Hilton, 
1976: 13). Under capitalism, a market society emerged which released feudal subjects 
from manorial bondage, while also permitting members of the landless working-class to 
exchange labour power for wages which were paid out by the owners of the means of 
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industrial production (Macpherson, 1965: 7). Today, wage labour is conventionally 
understood to represent a mutually beneficial economic arrangement which employers 
and employees enter into ‘voluntarily’. Nevertheless, the Marxist interpretation, which 
goes beyond superficial analysis, reveals that the social relations of capitalist production 
are not only imbued with asymmetric power differentials, but they are also inherently 
exploitative.  
Since subsistence farming was forcefully and violently suppressed at the dawn of 
the Industrial Revolution, workers were required to offer their labour services to 
employers in order to ensure an adequate standard of material well-being. Hick and 
Allahar (2011: 10) astutely convey that modern workers are coerced into both formal, and 
informal, market-based contracts under economic duress. The only alternative to wage 
labour is slow starvation and eventual death, so the proletariat ‘accept’ unfair 
compensation, as well as poor working conditions, “under the compulsion of the whip of 
hunger” (Weber, 1927: 110). An immiserated class of workers, which owns nothing else 
but its labour power, is indispensable for the optimal functioning of the economic system. 
In late capitalist societies, the central industrialist imperatives of surplus value extraction, 
and profit maximization, continue to be realized through the perpetual reproduction, 
expansion, and intensification of the exploitative relations of production.  
In the “Manifesto”, Marx and Engels envisioned alternative socialist visions for 
human relations, and the social, political, and economic ordering of society. The radical 
social theorists contended that the demise of capitalism, and by extension the bourgeoisie, 
was dialectically tied to the masses developing a subjective awareness of their common 
grievances against the dominant class, as well as the structural conditions which 
perpetuate economic domination. The revolutionary impetus for social change was to be 
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provided by the internal contradictions of capital accumulation, which according to Marx 
and Engels, would inevitably generate antagonisms between “the exploiting appropriators 
and the exploited producers” (Quoted in Wood, 2015: 117).  
Once workers realized that their class interests were antithetical to that of the 
capitalist owners, they were expected to institute a proletarian dictatorship, and 
eventually abolish the system of private ownership. Social inequality would be eradicated 
when the state ultimately withered away, and a classless workers’ utopia would be 
realized under communism (Kleinman, 2000: 130). Considering the dynamism of global 
capitalism, and the fact that the proletariat has failed to accomplish the revolutionary role 
that Marx and Engels once ascribed to its constituents, theories that are supposedly 
couched in the dogma of economic determinism have been repudiated by the traditional 
intelligentsia.  
Differentiating Between Class Consciousness and False Consciousness: 
 Within developed, and underdeveloped capitalist societies, the intensification of 
exploitation, and perpetual impoverishment of the proletariat, has failed to produce the 
conditions necessary for class struggle. Many bourgeois commentators have postulated 
that the absence of revolutionary determination is indicative of the ideological demise of 
Marxism. Still, critical intellectuals, who remain fundamentally aligned with the Marxist 
tradition, maintain that human emancipation is predicated upon the masses developing a 
genuine class consciousness. Though Marx did not formulate a coherent theory of class 
consciousness, his distinction between a “class in itself” and a “class for itself” has 
served as the conceptual foundation for the analysis of this historical phenomenon.  
A class in itself denotes a categorization of individuals that merely share a 
common relationship to the means of production. This classification is applicable to the 
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working-classes of both the Global North and Global South. While these workers 
objectively constitute a class in opposition to capital, they remain incognizant of their 
conflictive connection with the dominant class. In contrast, a class for itself refers to a 
group of individuals that have attained a genuine understanding of their objective position 
within the hierarchy of power relations, and a subjective awareness of their common 
grievances against the dominant class (Swingewood, 1975: 113).  
Class consciousness can be differentiated from the conception of false 
consciousness. The latter refers to a state of delusion that arises when exploited group 
members accept the prevailing worldview that has been manufactured to protect and 
serve the interests of powerful elites. An individual that acts contrary to his or her own 
self-interests, or class interests, is thought to be suffering from false consciousness. 
Scholars within the Marxist tradition have used the theory of false consciousness to 
explain the proletariat’s complacency, and the unconsummated revolutionary drama that 
was envisioned in the “Manifesto”. Nevertheless, while Marx was cognizant of the 
illusory nature of ideology, he never explicitly used the term in his writings.  
 The concept was originally introduced in a letter written by Engels, and later 
developed in the carceral writings of Gramsci, the highly influential neo-Marxist theorist 
and Italian politician. Gramsci reasoned that class domination is not exclusively sustained 
through material wealth or political power (Seidman, 2012: 133). Within capitalist 
societies, the ruling class also actively imposes its ideology on to the common people in 
order to legitimize, and reinforce, its dominant position. Since inequalities can potentially 
produce conflict and generate social upheaval, Gramsci ascertained that the oppressors 
must successfully attain the consent of the oppressed to achieve a state of “unstable 
equilibrium” (Williams, 2006: 178).  
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Today, this task is accomplished through the mass diffusion of bourgeois class 
culture and political values within the institutions of civil society. Members of the 
working-class accept, and internalize, the prevailing worldview of the dominant class as 
commonsensical and natural due to a relentless process of cultural and political 
conditioning. In the “Prison Notebooks”, Gramsci referred to the project of consensus 
building as cultural hegemony. Prior to the advent of the industrial revolution, dominant 
classes employed brute force in order to maintain exploitative power relations.  
In capitalist societies, socio-political order relies heavily upon a delicate balance 
between coercion and consent (Ornstein and Stevenson, 1999: 24). Coercion is typically 
reserved for extreme dissonance since the consent of the dominated sufficiently 
guarantees the production of docile bodies, and the maintenance of social control. Class 
rule is perceived to be democratic rule by the great masses of the population since the 
inherent contradictions of the mode of production are obfuscated by the dominant 
ideology (Seidman, 2012: 137).  
Despite the highly incisive, and deeply profound, analyses presented within the 
“Prison Notebooks”, arguments predicated upon the logic of false consciousness have 
fallen into disrepute. Berger (1975: 34) charges that false consciousness is a highly 
problematic contention since it presupposes that “…lower-class people do not understand 
their own situation, that they are in need of enlightenment on the matter, and that this 
service can be provided by selected higher-class individuals”. According to Berger’s line 
of reasoning, false consciousness is a pejorative theoretical proposition which is founded 
upon the intellectual superiority of an exalted group of individuals who can objectively 
know, and define, what constitutes ‘reality’. Considering that ideologies selectively 
illuminate and conceal the ontological conditions of reality, the social world is never 
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objectively accessible to observers irrespective of their intellectual or cognitive capacities 
(Allahar and Côté, 1998: 1).  
McLaverty (2005: 52) further problematizes the vanguardist implications of 
consciousness raising exercises by compellingly arguing that social classes are not 
homogenous groupings. Within post-colonial capitalist societies, distinctive markers of 
identity like race and ethnicity intersect and compound to determine an individual’s 
position within the social stratification hierarchy. Consequently, objective interests 
cannot be reduced exclusively to economic terms since members of the proletariat may 
face divergent trajectories depending on their membership in racial, ethnic, or other non-
class-based groupings.  
 It should be noted that while discernible differences exist between race and 
ethnicity, these concepts are often used interchangeably within academia to distinguish 
between groups that claim to share a myth of common descent, as well as linguistic and 
cultural similarities (James and Goetze, 2001: 32). According to Bonacich (1972: 548), 
“[t]he difference between race and ethnicity lies in the size of the locale from which a 
group stems, races generally coming from continents, and ethnicities from national sub-
sections of continents”. In the past, race was assumed to have a biological foundation 
however, genomic studies of human populations have revealed that “…there is more 
variation within races than between them” (Williams, 2001: 4833). Thus, like ethnicity 
which is determined by cultural factors, most scientists agree that race is primarily a 
social construct (Douglas, 2011; Mahtani, 2014; Calvert and Terry, 2005).   
Socially constructed identity markers must be understood in relation to the 
Thomas Principle: “if [people] define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences” (Quoted in Merton, 1995: 340). Despite the fact that both race and 
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ethnicity are devoid of biological dimensions, being born black has very real 
consequences in traditional and modern societies. Colour prejudice is especially prevalent 
in the contested Sikh homeland of Punjab, in which the untouchable Mahazabis and 
Dalits reside in large numbers. Akin to the historically oppressed Aboriginal population 
of Canada, the dark-skinned untouchables of Punjab are the first people of the Indian 
subcontinent. According to Rathna (2014: 21):  
Dalits have been treated worse than animals…They are 
ordained to do menial jobs and even prohibited to share the 
natural resources like water with the upper castes. Even 
their very sight and touch have been considered as impure 
and taboo….Their subhuman life has been accepted by 
them as well as the upper castes as an order of the life 
(Rathna, 2014: 20). 
In 2012, the National Crime Records Bureau reported that every two minutes, somewhere 
in India, an untouchable is victimized (Quoted in Ambedkar, 2014: 27). Upper-caste Sikh 
zamindars (landowners), who have multiple Dalits and Mahzabis under their employ, 
have perpetrated profound violence against members of the downtrodden castes. In one 
high profile case, a group of Jats cleaved off the arms and legs of a Sikh Mazhabi who 
filed a police complaint against them for gang-raping his daughter (Human Rights Watch, 
2007: 60). Paradoxically, Sikhs adhere to a religious text which condemns violence 
against women, and discrimination on the basis of caste. 
Phenotypical features and primordial statuses also affect resource allocation, and 
the distribution of non-material assets and privileges within ‘progressive’ countries like 
Canada. Studies have consistently demonstrated that Canadian-born visible minorities, 
and foreign-born immigrants, face “…overt prejudice and systemic discrimination in 
housing, education, employment and the justice system, and in places of recreation and 
worship” (Christensen, 2009: 212). Despite these empirical realities, vulgar Marxists 
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maintain that non-class-based identification constitutes false consciousness since racial 
allegiances, and ethnic loyalties, distract individuals from realizing the genuine economic 
basis of exploitation. In the economic determinist discourses advanced by these theorists, 
the differential lived experiences of post-colonial subjects, and their vulnerable 
positionalities in dominant hegemonic institutions, have either been willfully disregarded 
or unconsciously ignored.  
 In reality, within societies that are internally fragmented on the basis of caste, 
race, and ethnicity, an individual that fails to acknowledge the importance of 
phenotypical and cultural markers of identity may arguably be suffering from false 
consciousness. Still, even though racial or ethnic awareness cannot be relegated to the 
status of false consciousness, social justice cannot be achieved by exclusively focusing 
on the systemic, or institutional forms of oppression faced by visible minorities. As 
astutely conveyed by Marx and Engels in the “Manifesto”, inequality can only be 
eradicated through the abolition of private property, and the institution of communism.  
 Progressive global change is contingent upon the interiorization of disparate 
socio-political movements for racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual equity under the larger 
project of revolutionary class struggle. Social class is not only the fundamental source of 
human suffering within developed and underdeveloped countries, but it also represents 
the most viable vehicle for generating collective consciousness and solidarity. Yet, 
practical politics, which are based predominantly on the similarities that people share as 
national and global constituents, have been displaced in favour of politics revolving 
around private identities and difference (Elshstain, 1995: 27).  
 Identity may not be reducible simply to class position however, inequalities 
stemming from socially constructed racial and ethnic categories can best be understood in 
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relation to the historical materialist perspective. A genuine sociological appreciation of 
these identity markers recognizes that people use ascriptive classifications to heuristically 
differentiate between affluence and scarcity, and between the core and periphery (Shils, 
1968: 283). While opportunities for vertical class mobility are highly constrained in both 
India and Canada, the symbolic importance ascribed to non-dominant phenotypical, 
ethnic, and cultural identity markers varies inversely with the acquisition of economic 
capital. Gordon Lewis’s (1983: 10; emphasis added) famous aphorism substantiates this 
claim: “…in U.S. society, money talks; in Caribbean society, money whitens”.  
In line with neo-Marxist theory, non-class markers of identity like caste, race and 
ethnicity should be understood as the epiphenomena of class division and the social 
relations of production. Nonetheless, this argument should not detract from the hardships 
and lived experiences of those that endure other forms of subjugation. While 
acknowledging the multidimensional basis of inequality, the discussion that follows will 
attempt to qualify the conception of false consciousness since it is still useful for 
understanding how hegemonic social control is maintained in both core, and periphery, 
capitalist societies despite bourgeoning inequalities.  
SECTION II: RETHINKING GLOBAL SOLIDARITY AND PROLETARIAN 
INTERNATIONALISM   
The Unfulfilled Promise of Modernity: 
 Political-economic sociologists have employed Marxian class theory to undertake 
exhaustive analyses of the (d)evolution of capitalism in the age of globalization. Critical 
scholarship in the arts and humanities has been dominated by the study of globalization 
however, precise conceptualization of the phenomenon has been severely complicated by 
theoretical ambiguities pertaining to its historical origins, and long-term consequences 
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(Hebron and Stack, 2011: 17). In its current phase, globalization can be understood as a 
pattern of accelerated geopolitical interdependence that has been promoted, and 
reinforced, by the universal ascendance and application of neoliberal policies and 
institutional practices (Woodley, 2015: 177).  
 Initially popularized by the ultra-conservative Thatcher and Reagan 
administrations, neoliberalism refers to a controversial political-economic ideology that is 
predicated upon the logic of radical laissez-faire market principles, and deregulatory 
mechanisms. Ideologues of neoliberal macroeconomic doctrine stipulate that state 
intervention should be minimized in the ‘free’ market since it is unconducive to growth 
and development (Chomsky, 1999: 7). In stark contrast to the scholars and economists 
intellectually aligned with the Marxist tradition, proponents of neoliberal policies argue 
that private sector interests should retain unfettered control over the market economy 
(Harvey, 2005: 3). 
 Market fundamentalists reason that the invisible hands of capitalism provide 
effective regulatory mechanisms for the ‘free’ flow of goods, services, labour, and money 
across international borders and territories. Open borders, which accommodate 
international trade and commerce, will inevitably produce a society of affluence when the 
“…profitability of capital drip[s] down the social pyramid to benefit the poor” (Paupp, 
2009: 1). Globalists, and other uncritical advocates of neoliberal hegemony, have failed 
to account for the uneven development trajectories of newly industrialized countries like 
India, and the inadvertent repercussions of globalization.  
 The rise of corporate tyranny, far-flung sweatshops, pervasive global economic 
disparity, and widespread ecological destruction are amongst the mass of insoluble 
problems associated with globalization and the ‘self-regulating’ marketplace. Recently, 
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public awareness has heightened in response to the ubiquitous and incessant nature of 
these deeply problematic tendencies. Still, the economic system has remained immune, 
and perhaps even fortified by the endemic crises of production. In order to understand the 
fundamental contradictions of this new era of neoliberal capitalism, Marxism must be 
retained in the form of a “living project” (Bartolovich and Lazarus, 2002: 16).  
The “Manifesto” continues to represent a politically and intellectually 
indispensable directive in what Klein (2007) refers to as the age of “disaster capitalism”. 
Not only do Marx’s writings continue to provide highly relevant and critical diagnoses of 
the mode and relations of production, but they also present a view of an egalitarian future 
devoid of exploitation and human suffering (McLennan, 1999: 564). Even the most 
superficial analysis of the “Manifesto” reveals that Marx (1848: 12; emphasis added) was 
cognizant of the dynamic ordering of production, and the fluidity of economic capital:  
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products 
chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the 
globe…All old-established national industries have been 
destroyed…In place of the old local and national seclusion 
and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, 
universal inter-dependence of nations. The bourgeoisie, by 
the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by 
the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws 
all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. 
This lengthy passage not only exemplifies the veracity and prophetic astuteness of 
Marx’s observations, but also the profound Eurocentrism upon which his analysis was 
centered. In his other works, Marx also famously proclaimed that countries like India and 
China were inhabited by “semi-barbaric” and “semi-civilized” populations that were 
devoid of history (Ganguly, 1979: 117). Although the homogenization and 
hierarchization of entire cultures is undoubtedly problematic, Marx was fundamentally 
concerned with the project of global social justice.  
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 At the heart of Marx’s (1848: 22) polemical treatise is an exhortatory call to 
action: “working men of all countries, unite”. Though the proletariat would initially 
contend with the oppressors of their respective homelands, Marx envisioned that class 
struggle would eventually transcend the confines of national borders. Ascriptive 
characteristics, and nationalist sentiments, were consequently depreciated by Marx since 
he was aware that they promoted divisiveness, and were unconducive to proletarian 
internationalism. Like other modernist theorists, Marx mistakenly presumed that “…in 
the wake of modernization and secularism, irrational considerations such as race or blind 
ethnic allegiance would give way to rational and universalist factors such as class” (Ryan, 
2005: vii; emphasis added).  
 Traditional identities and ‘irrational’ allegiances have not only persisted, they 
have become more salient for their bearers during the period of global capitalism. This 
major theoretical oversight represents the biggest failure of orthodox Marxist theory 
(Allahar, 2005: 12).  Considering that the proletariat has failed to develop a revolutionary 
class consciousness, and the fact that identity has become an ever-more complex and 
elusive concept during the contemporary era, Marx’s promise of modernity has failed to 
materialize.  
Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Ethnic Violence:   
 Reforms predicated upon the logic of neoliberalism have resulted in the erosion of 
sovereign autonomy, which was once exclusively exercised by the nation-state over its 
respective population. In the altered terrain of contemporary geopolitics, elected officials 
have been stripped of their ability to govern, while the state apparatus has been reduced 
to a superconductor for surplus value extraction, and capitalist profit maximization 
(Hebron and Stack, 2011; Allahar and Côté, 1998). This being the case, Chomsky 
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indicates that within ‘democratic’ countries like Canada and India, “…elite elements 
based in the business community control the state by virtue of their dominance of the 
private society, while the population observes quietly” (Chomsky, 1990: 6). Despite 
periodic elections, and ostensible changes in national leadership, political, economic, and 
social policy is dictated by domestic economic interests, and transnational corporate 
entities, since governmental bodies are dependent upon them for investment capital, as 
well as job creation (Allahar and Côté, 1998: 14).   
While the significance of existing demarcated and socially constructed borders 
has diminished, globalization has attributed new importance to imagined political 
communities and ethno-nationalist separatist movements. Eitzen (2006: 211) fittingly 
compares the phenomenon of globalization to the Hindu deity Shiva since it “…is not 
only a great destroyer, but also a powerful creator of new ideas”. The recent proliferation 
of global communication technologies, and social networking outlets, has afforded 
oppressed groups new opportunities for converting long-standing ethno-cultural 
grievances into demands for self-determination and separatism. The Sikhs are among the 
growing number of stateless groups who have attempted to promote, and politicize, their 
communal identity to achieve nationalist objectives including secession (Amoretti and 
Bermeo, 2004: 288).   
Before considering the emergence of Khalistani ethno-nationalism in Punjab, and 
the propagation of the Canadian Sikh diaspora (herein referred to as the Sikh diaspora), it 
is first necessary to clarify the meaning of some relevant concepts in the migration 
literature. As previously suggested, the term ethnicity is used to differentiate between 
groups that share distinctive socio-cultural attributes, and adhere to a myth of common 
genealogical descent. It is important to note that while ethnicity is ascriptive, and 
21 
 
 
boundaries for in-group and out-group membership are socially constructed, individuals 
can share emotional affinities with their co-ethnics that can be as intense as 
consanguineal bonds (Allahar, 2005: 235).  
Although prospects for proletarian internationalism have continually diminished 
due to the lack of subjective class identification in developed and underdeveloped 
societies, ethnicity has gained new salience in the politics of decolonization and nation-
building. In the present context, nationalism refers to the shared ideology of a group of 
people that have sovereign authority over a clearly demarcated territory, or the process 
whereby individuals who claim to share common characteristics coalesce in order to 
achieve independence and establish a homeland (Allahar, 2005; Bishku, 2010). Anderson 
(1983: 6) claims that a nation is "…imagined because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members… yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion". Thus, like ethnic groupings, nations can be conceived of as 
fictive constructions since they are not rooted in objective or material reality.  
Yet, Colvard (1998: vii) conveys that when opportunistic political leaders, or 
ethnic entrepreneurs, inculcate and mobilize their co-ethnics using elaborate mythologies 
of chosen people, the result can be real bloodshed. The Sikh Ghallughara (holocaust) 
represents one of the many violent manifestations of ethno-nationalism during the 
twentieth century. Even though ethnic mobilization has historically resulted in violent 
pogroms and purgative attacks, nationalism can also be a unifying force which is capable 
of generating collective effervescence. Today, members of transnational diasporas, who 
are physically separated but still emotionally tied to their countries of origin, endure the 
profound impact of global uprooting through ethnic loyalties, and national affiliation. 
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Transnational Diasporas and Ethnic Enclaves: 
Traditional ethnic loyalties have persisted despite the significant challenge of 
cosmopolitanism which has been posed by the transnational flow of people from the 
periphery to the core regions, and vice-versa (Sutherland, 2012: ix). Mass migration has 
facilitated the creation of diasporic communities by enabling the transmission of diverse 
populations, and their distinctive ethno-cultural elements, beyond ancestral homelands. 
The by-product of loosening territorial ties, the diaspora is a “home away from home” 
(Allahar, 2010: 62) that is composed of immigrants that share the same nationality, but 
have settled outside of their country of origin either voluntarily or involuntarily.  
 While diasporas appeal to the primordial ideas of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’, these 
movements are transnational since they span across nation-states (Dusenbery, 2005: 485). 
Within the confines of demarcated borders, diasporas tend to have perceptible 
geographical and residential locations sometimes referred to as ethnic enclaves. The 
densely populated suburban community of Brampton-Springdale, colloquially known as 
‘Singhdale’, is one of many ethnic enclaves that has emerged in Canada over the past 
several decades. Sikh secessionist leaders, and organized militant groups, have drawn 
considerable moral, economic, and social support from their co-ethnics that have settled 
within this immigrant-receiving hub.    
The proliferation of diasporas is in direct opposition to the melting pot theory of 
ethnic relations which held sway in the migration literature for several decades 
(Hirschman, 1983: 399). In the past, classical assimilation theorists postulated that 
immigrants incorporated into the host country over time by adopting mainstream norms 
and values (Alba and Nee, 1997: 328). Assimilation was presumed to follow a straight 
line trajectory in which, upward social mobility in both education and occupation, were 
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normative expectations associated with successful cultural integration (Waters et al., 
2010: 1168). Nonetheless, first, second, and even third-generation immigrants, are 
actively retaining their distinctive traditions and cultural identities as opposed to 
discarding them.  
A large body of scholarly research has been developed on the segmented 
assimilation trajectories of immigrant youth. Segmented assimilation refers to the process 
whereby individuals either end up “…ascending into the ranks of a prosperous middle 
class, or join in large numbers the ranks of a racialized, permanently impoverished 
population at the bottom of society” (Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller, 2005: 1004). 
Allahar (2011: 66) hypothesizes that diasporas are populated by the latter group of 
immigrants since identification with these types of communities is class-differentiated. 
Typically, individuals who possess greater social, cultural, and economic capital are less 
likely to identify, or reside within, diasporic communities than their lower-class 
compatriots.  
Studies have revealed that immigrants with higher SES are usually better 
equipped to deal with the challenges posed by displacement, relocation and integration 
(Lansford, 2011; Jardine, 2008). Xie and Greenman (2011: 966) found that immigrants 
with lower SES incorporated into the host society much more gradually than their higher 
SES counterparts and that, the latter group had higher educational achievement and 
elevated psychological well-being. These discrepancies may be attributable to the fact 
that children of low SES immigrants tend to face similar barriers to social and economic 
integration as their parents did (Palameta, 2007: 4). Osterberg (2000: 157) established a 
link between low educational attainment amongst first-generation immigrants and poorer 
outcomes in the labour market for their offspring. A number of other studies have 
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corroborated that socioeconomic factors account significantly for the differential 
experiences of second-generation immigrant youth (Nielsen et al., 2001; Van Ours and 
Veenman, 2002).  
The social organization of the receiving community also has significant 
implications for the adaptation patterns of immigrant youth. If, for instance, the 
immigrant community is highly concentrated into an ethnic enclave, assimilation is not 
always necessary for integration. Danzer and Yaman (2013: 211) contend that the 
“…presence of co-ethnics increases migrants' interaction cost with natives and thus 
reduces the likelihood of integration”. Moreover, since diasporic communities tend to 
develop culturally exclusive, and mutually self-interacting institutions which run parallel 
to ones which already exist in the host country, integration is further obstructed (Allahar, 
2011: 69).  
This form of closed-off social organization within diasporic communities is 
referred to as institutional completeness (Breton, 1964: 193). When a diasporic 
community becomes institutionally complete, jobs, goods and services become readily 
available to co-ethnics within the confines of the enclave. Interactions with ethnic 
entrepreneurs from the homeland, and the ready availability of familiar foods and music, 
are all conducive to the retention of diasporic identity.  
Nonetheless, in any capitalist society, resources and jobs are scarce while 
competition is high. Immigrants who perceive an imbalance of opportunity are more 
likely to prospect beyond the social boundaries of the diaspora. Since immigrants 
typically drift away over time as a consequence of occupational mobility, diasporas are 
generally typified as stable working-class communities (Allahar, 2011: 65). Moreover, 
when the children and grandchildren of immigrants move away from these enclaves, 
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economic and social integration become much more likely. Outside of the enclave, 
immigrants are afforded greater opportunity for interaction with the native-born 
population, and ethnic or racial intermarriage which may shift or blur diasporic identities 
(Qian and Lichter, 2007: 68). 
While assimilation may be a pursuable goal for some immigrant groups, 
resembling the dominant group in the receiving society may not necessarily be a ‘free’, or 
rational choice others can make (Torres, 2003: 51). Immigrants that have dissimilar 
phenotypical attributes, or those that dress in distinctive cultural apparel, may never be 
able to integrate fully into the host society due to widespread xenophobia, or the presence 
of structural racism. Ghuman (1997: 31) acknowledges that “[t]he state of race relations 
in the wider society affects young people's perception of how far they are willing to go in 
their adaptation process, which can range from assimilation on the one hand, to 
separation on the other”. If racism and discrimination are rampant, identification with the 
diaspora may be the only viable option available to visible minority group members.   
SECTION III: THE CASE OF KHALISTANI ETHNO-NATIONALISM  
The Sikh Qaum and the Land of Five Rivers:  
The ethnonational aspirations of the Sikh community emerged in Punjab during 
the abdication of colonial rule. For over two centuries, the British Raj successfully 
employed divide and rule strategies to retain social control over the heterogeneous Indian 
population, while simultaneously exercising unparalleled political-economic domination 
over the vast resources concentrated within the semiautonomous Princely States. 
Following the culmination of the Second World War, violent and non-violent struggles 
between the colonizers and the colonized became pronounced. Eventually, the British 
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Empire was forced to relinquish ownership of the Crown jewel over to pro-independence, 
indigenous elites.  
The Punjabi-Sikhs, and their co-ethnics settled abroad, played a pivotal role in the 
Indian Independence Movement. Yet, polarized Hindu and Muslim visions of the post-
colonial state generated new anxieties in the Sikh psyche. The two-nation boundary 
demarcation line, which was proposed by the competing nationalist elite, would 
effectively rupture Punjab and divide the Sikh constituency (Telford, 1992: 969). Like 
other ethnic minority groups in India, the Sikhs of Punjab recognized that the 
implementation of the territorial partition arrangement would result in large-scale losses 
in political power, land ownership, and control over the community’s religious shrines 
(Kudaisya and Yong, 2004: 122). Consequently, alongside the dominant All-Indian 
Muslim League, and the powerful Indian National Congress (INC), the Sikh-centric 
Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) submitted its Azad (independent) Punjab Scheme during 
partition planning.  
Punjab had represented the traditional homeland of the Sikhs prior to the 
institution of Crown rule, as well as the primordial anchorage of the Khalsa Panth (pure 
community). On the basis of these ancient territorial claims, the architects of the Azad 
Punjab Scheme defined the Sikhs as a qaum (nation), and demanded a sovereign 
homeland that would ensure the preservation of their distinctive social, cultural, and 
religious identity (Chima, 2008; Spickard, 2005). The Sikh political leaders adamantly 
voiced their disapproval of the envisioned political borders of India and Pakistan, which 
they alleged would manifest respectively in Hindu and Muslim tyranny (McLeod, 2008: 
91).  
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Axel (2001: 81) notes that members of the SAD were internally divided on the 
issue of political secession. Some were in favour of a united India, in which significant 
political leverage was awarded to the SAD. Others insisted that, if Pakistan was to be 
acceded by the British, the Northern state of Punjab should also be detracted from Hindu-
dominated India to form Khalistan. Despite conflicting views among members of the 
SAD, the party remained unified around its central goal of maximizing autonomy in the 
affairs of Punjab. As opposed to perpetual servitude, the landed Sikh gentry, which 
occupied the SAD’s political ranks, sought “…a share in political power and not merely a 
change of masters” (Singh, 2014: 2). Nevertheless, the Azad Punjab scheme was deemed 
unfeasible and the Sikh leadership became marginalized in the politics of decolonization 
and nation-building.  
The SAD eventually acquiesced to the INC’s ‘secular’ vision of the Indian nation-
state upon being granted assurances for special status in the administrative and 
constitutional affairs of Punjab (Riar, 2006: 58). Still, despite the Sikh leaders’ 
cooperation, concerted efforts to placate and unify the principal proponents of Pakistan 
under an ‘inclusionary’ Indian nationalist agenda were largely ineffective. Therefore, the 
Boundary Commission reluctantly mandated that the vast subcontinent be divided on the 
basis of seemingly irreconcilable religious differences between British India’s Hindu and 
Islamic communities (Mason and Mason, 1997: 259). The implementation of the 
Mountbatten partition plan, and the dissolution of the British Raj, resulted in the 
formation of the independent dominions of India and Pakistan on August 15th, 1947.  
Unprecedented communal violence erupted between Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims 
within the newly formed state borders. Though the colonial power withdrew almost 
completely unscathed, an estimated one million people perished in the process of 
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partition, and over twelve million others were displaced during the mass population 
transfers that took place in the land of five rivers (Zamindar, 2013: 58). When the dust 
settled, and the “fratricidal bloodbath” subsided, the INC inherited power from the 
colonial regime and emerged as the central governing body of the Republic of India 
(Fanon, 1961: 17).  
Despite the enticing political promises made by the Indian nationalist leadership, 
the Constituent Assembly immediately rescinded the special recognition that was to be 
granted to the Sikh community for their loyalty, and significant contributions to the 
struggle for independence (Singh and Tatla, 2006: 67). Due to the Sikhs minority status 
within the Hindu-dominated peripheral state, this decision rendered the SAD virtually 
powerless in the governance of Punjab. In an effort to widen their constituency, and 
achieve greater political autonomy, the SAD launched the Punjab Suba (province) 
movement during the first legislative assembly elections in 1952. By this time, the Sikh 
political leadership had joined the “…chorus of peripheral protests [which] arose as 
minorities and disadvantaged classes began to see that the independence promise of an 
egalitarian and secular India was not being fully met” (Mahmood, 2014: 572).  
Though the SAD’s movement was initially unsuccessful, sustained extra-
parliamentary agitation forced the INC to accede to the creation of a culturally, and 
linguistically congruent Punjab Suba in 1966 (Telford, 1992: 969). Under the leadership 
of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the united multilingual state was divided into the 
predominantly Hindi-speaking Haryana and Himachal Pradesh regions, while the 
remaining areas, except for Chandigarh, formed the new unilingual Punjab 
(Juergensmeyer, 2014: 388).  
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Before the linguistic reorganization of the state in 1966, Sikhs had only 
constituted 35% of the total state population (Basran and Bolaria, 2004: 67). As a result 
of trifurcation, they formed a 60% majority in the Punjab Suba (Chiriyankandath, 2016: 
56). Nevertheless, the SAD’s political victory came at a heavy cost. Under the Punjab 
Reorganization Act, the central government managed to achieve exclusive control over 
the transfer of natural resources between the newborn states. Whereas the lush forested 
areas and abundant mineral wealth were reallocated to Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, 
Punjab was left solely with its river waters (Singh, 1997: 36). 
Even after the uneven redistribution of the eco-rich land, the SAD remained 
internally fragmented. Most members reiterated their pre-independence demand for a 
separate Sikh homeland within India. Yet, from the margins, others continued to vocalize 
demands for political secession and Khalistan. In spite of competing solutions to the 
Punjab problem, the SAD managed to consolidate support for greater regional autonomy 
from the majority Sikh electorate, while remaining in a state of perpetual mobilization 
against the central government in Delhi.  
In an effort to correct the lame reorganization of the Suba, the Anandpur Sahib 
Resolution (ASR) was drafted and proposed to the central government in 1973 by the 
SAD. The resolution, which was heavily couched in orthodox Sikh dogma, was primarily 
concerned with the level of centralization developing in the affairs of Punjab. In total, 
forty-five economic, cultural, religious, and constitutional demands were made in order to 
renegotiate the balance of power between the central and state government (Basran and 
Bolaria, 2004: 75).  
The first ASR was dismissed when Gandhi declared a state of emergency, and 
established dictatorial control over India. As opposed to devolving power to the states, 
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for a twenty-one month period the Prime Minister employed extra-constitutional 
authority to rule over the vast nation by decree (Bharat, 2015: 11). State elections were 
suspended, slums were razed to the ground, and many of Gandhi’s political adversaries 
were detained and tortured illegally (Chakrabarty, 2016: 161). In addition to these gross 
human right abuses, a mass-sterilization campaign was also initiated in the ‘democratic’ 
republic (Dwivedi and Rajan 2016: 155). Towards the end of the emergency period, 
Gandhi insidiously facilitated the induction of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale into the 
politics of the SAD.  
The puritan Sikh leader, Bhindranwale, was installed in order to dispel the sway 
of ethno-nationalism, and to further accentuate political divisions within the SAD (Vohra, 
1986: 1738). In the end, however, Gandhi’s campaign of manipulation had highly 
destructive and unintended consequences. When state elections were reinstated, 
Bhindranwale joined the SAD’s political struggle for Sikh sovereignty. In collaboration 
with the Sikh political leadership, Bhindranwale initiated a Dharam Yudh Morcha 
(righteous struggle) and revived the ASR (Singh, 2007: 560). In response, Gandhi 
classified the ASR as a secessionist document and vilified the entire Sikh community as 
treasonous and anti-Indian (Mahmood, 2014: 571).   
The Khalistani ethno-nationalist movement reached its zenith when Bhindranwale 
successfully converted the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) into a mass 
support base, and began his proselytizing program of Amrit Prachar (baptisms) in Punjab. 
While preaching for a return to austere living and Sikh orthodoxy to responsive 
audiences, Bhindranwale also put forward a historical narrative centered upon Hindu 
betrayal:  
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The Hindus are trying to enslave us; atrocities against the 
Sikhs are increasing day by day under the Hindu imperialist 
rulers of New Delhi; the Sikhs have never felt so 
humiliated, not even during the reign of the Moghul 
emperors and British colonialists. How long can the Sikhs 
tolerate injustice? (Telford, 1992: 975). 
Bhindranwale and his followers eventually rejected the SAD’s ‘moderate’ political 
agenda. Instead, they fortified themselves within the Harmandir Sahib Complex (also 
known as the Golden Temple) and began to stockpile arms.  
From within the precincts of the holy shrine, the militant revolutionary drew 
attention to the SAD’s contradictory religious and political-economic priorities: “we are 
losing our identity, and the interest of our Sikh leaders who have their farms and their 
industries at heart have started making them say that there is no difference between Sikh 
and Hindus” (Quoted in Rapoport, 2013: 181). Sikhs began to revere Bhindranwale as a 
sant-sipahi (saint-soldier) which allowed him to develop a cult-like following (Pettigrew, 
1995: 21). For nearly two years, Bhindranwale and his followers occupied the Golden 
temple and reigned terror on Punjab and surrounding areas. Police officers, state officials, 
Sikhs of lax faith, and non-Sikh civilians were targeted and mercilessly murdered by pro-
Khalistani factions.  
The rise of Sikh fundamentalism in Punjab eventually elicited a response from the 
central government in Delhi. In order to apprehend Bhindranwale, and put an end to the 
Khalistan movement, Gandhi sanctioned Operation Blue Star, and the Indian army 
subsequently infiltrated the Golden Temple on June 3rd, 1984. Considering that thousands 
of Sikh parishioners had arrived at the temple from all over India in observance of 
Gurpurb (day of remembrance), the operation was purposefully engineered in order to 
maximize death and destruction. Just before the bloody massacre ensued, a curfew was 
imposed in Punjab “…with all methods of communication and public travel suspended. 
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Electricity supply was also interrupted, creating a total blackout and cutting off the state 
from the rest of the world” (Rajeswar, 2015: 111).  
The armed Sikhs, who were led by Bhindranwale, were neutralized following 
three days of fierce gun fighting, and heavy shelling. The attack also resulted in the death 
of over 5000 civilians, and the desecration of temporal center of Khalsa Panth (Kapur, 
1986: 137). Operation Bluestar also set into motion a destructive chain of events. Several 
months after the attack, Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards. Following 
the cremation of the Prime Minister, Hindu mobs, amalgamated with police and state 
officials, began combing through villages necklacing Sikh men, raping women, and 
dismembering children (Pettigrew, 1995: 37). The Delhi ethnic cleansings led to a 
prolonged period of guerrilla warfare and insurgency in Punjab.  
Police and paramilitary forces actively engaged in gross human rights violations 
during the time. Human Rights Watch (1990: 7) has reported that high-ranking state 
officials and security personnel sanctioned “…brutal methods to stem the insurgency, 
including arbitrary arrests, torture, prolonged detention without trial, disappearances and 
summary killings of civilians and suspected militants”. Moderate Sikhs, who had 
vehemently condemned Bhindranwale, became radicalized due to the circumstances 
surrounding the Ghallughara, and the extra-judicial killings that took place following the 
attack on the Golden Temple. 
Ethnic Entrepreneurship and Religious Opiates: The Struggle for Ideological 
Hegemony in Punjab 
Sikh scholars and human rights activists have attributed the rise of religious 
fundamentalism in Punjab, and the virulent demand for the theocratic state of Khalistan, 
to the political marginalization of the community in post-independence India (Pruthi, 
2004; Kumar et al., 2003; Singh, 2013). In reality, however, the crisis in the contested 
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homeland was precipitated by the protracted hegemonic struggle which ensued between 
elite ethnic entrepreneurs in the Sikh and Hindu communities, as well as the 
socioeconomic contradictions of peripheral capitalist development. As in other parts of 
the Indian subcontinent, competing ethno-nationalist ideologies generated profound inter-
group conflict, and intensive intra-group competition, in Punjab following the collapse of 
the British Empire.  
Colonial encounter effectively transformed elite members of the Hindu ethnic 
community, who held a monopoly over trade and commerce in India since the 
culmination of Mughal rule, into the native bourgeoisie (Paranjape, 2012: 21). Dhulipala 
(2015: 55) indicates that exposure to the British education system accentuated the Hindu 
capitalist class’s subjective awareness of its economic interests, and facilitated the 
development of bourgeois consciousness among its members. Following the dissolution 
of the Raj, the Hindu bourgeoisie managed to legitimize its dominant position in the 
political, economic, and social affairs of India through its representatives in the INC and 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).  
Due to its pivotal role in the Independence Movement, the INC has sustained 
mass appeal among the heterogeneous Indian electorate. While explicitly enunciating 
secular ideals, the party has implicitly adhered to the ideology of Hindutva since its 
formation (Swain, 2001: 93). As opposed to the INC, leaders of the BJP have actively 
identified India as the critical site of Hindu Jagriti (awakening), and openly professed 
their desire for Bharat Mata to be governed in accordance with the “great teachings of the 
Vedas” (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2016).  
Today, despite the fact that religious pluralism is enshrined in the constitution, the 
state apparatuses coalition with the right-wing ideological think tank the Rashtriya 
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Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and the militant Bajrang Dal, reveal that India is 
fundamentally a Hindu nation (Verdeja and Smith, 2013: 84). For the most part, the 
BJP’s Hindutva orientation, and the INC’s ‘secular’ political strategy, have been 
conducive to social stability since the Indian population predominantly belongs to the 
Hindu faith, and because ideological sanctions for pervasive power, wealth, and status 
differentials are inherently built into the Vedic scriptures (Tatla, 2006: 43).  For obvious 
reasons, however, the implementation of Hindu ethnocracy has generated considerable 
resentment among ethno-religious minority groups in post-independence India.  
Shortly after Punjab was partitioned, conflicting factions in the Sikh community 
advanced counter-hegemonic cultural discourses against the central rulers in Delhi. The 
homeland struggle was initiated by the SAD, and eventually hijacked by the militant 
orthodox priest Bhindranwale, and his army composed primarily of peasant insurgents 
(Telford, 1992: 970). Historically, Akali leaders have projected themselves as the 
exclusive spiritual and political custodians of the Khalsa Panth by employing the 
orthodox doctrine of Miri-Piri, which “…implies that the Sikhs constitute not merely a 
fraternity of the faith followers but also a political community in the sense of a sovereign 
peoplehood” (Ahluwalia, 2003: 12). Yet, internal dissension and disunity in the political 
community is exhibited by the stark class, caste, and sect cleavages that exist between 
Sikhs, as well as the antithetical post-independence goals pursued by their leaders (Tatla, 
2006: 12).  
The deterioration of communal relations, and the armed uprising in Punjab, must 
be understood in relation to the concrete class interests of the principal exponents of 
Khalistan since ethnies are not universally homogenous groups, and because economic 
incentives exist for seizing state power in post-colonial societies (Allahar, 2008: 1). In 
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Punjab, the Sikh-centric SAD has overtly asserted itself as the champions of Khalsa, 
while covertly catering to the class interests of the agrarian rich Jats (Baaklini and 
Desfosses, 2016: 148). Control over religious shrines, schools, and the highly lucrative 
Shiromnani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), has allowed the SAD to define 
Sikh identity, and homogenize the interests of the entire community in accordance with 
the political-economic objectives of the Sikh bourgeoisie (Tatla, 1999: 18).  
The affinity between India’s public and private sectors is affirmed by the 
commercial interests of party leaders at the national, state, and district levels. Sukhbir 
Singh Badal, the reigning president of the SAD, and his predecessors, have utilized the 
profits accrued from industrialized agricultural practices to purchase political power in 
Punjab (Sidhu, Brar, and Punia, 2009: 48). Badal, and his political rivals that occupy the 
ranks of the INC and BJP, have managed to actively mask their bourgeois class-caste 
interests by disseminating communal ideologies, and mobilizing members of their 
respective ethno-religious communities on the basis of primordial myths. Consequently, 
in post-independence India, the gravediggers of capitalism have been transmuted into 
expendable pawns in the national elites’ quest for material domination, and ideological 
hegemony.  
During its prolonged campaign for regional autonomy, the SAD used religious 
appeals to garner support from Punjab’s rural peasantry. By exploiting the illiteracy and 
orthodoxy of their principal electorate, the Sikh political leadership insisted that the 
preeminence of the community could only be guaranteed if the Indian government 
submitted to the ASR. The SAD emphasized the symbolic, theopolitical underpinnings of 
the resolution in order to distract underprivileged Sikhs from realizing some of its more 
insidious aims. These included the reassessment of minimum wage policies, 
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improvements in irrigation facilities, and liberalized credit to support greater agricultural 
productivity (Singh, 1984: 45). In reality, the demands outlined in the resolution were 
concerned with increasing the profitability of capital-intensive farming practices in 
Punjab.  
Since the ASR posed a threat to the status-quo, and the economic interests of the 
Hindu bourgeoisie, the document was disparaged by Gandhi. During this time, ruling 
class hegemony was also challenged in other parts of India, and the central government 
was forced to declare a state of emergency. When the Sikhs, and other distinctive ethno-
religious groups that comprised the heterogeneous Indian population could no longer be 
kept in line through the project of consensus building, Gandhi employed the state’s 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Security analysts recognized the profound 
danger posed by Khalistan, so Gandhi appropriated the divide and rule tactics of the 
colonizers, and positioned Bhindranwale as a counterweight against her political rivals in 
the SAD (Singh and Fenech, 2014: 90).  
The Prime Minister had planned to exploit the religious leader for her personal 
political gains, but Bhindranwale managed to ingeniously outmaneuver both the Hindu, 
and Sikh bourgeoisie (Tambiah, 1997: 106). Akin to the political leaders of the SAD, and 
the INC, Bhindranwale was a rational actor with his own political-economic goals. Under 
the patronage of the INC, Bhindranwale had unsuccessfully led an election campaign for 
control of the SGPC (Gupte, 2012: 314). The elected committee of representatives, which 
manages the finances and daily operations of all Sikh gurdwaras in India, reported an 
annual budget of 993 crores ($1,955,846 CAD) in 2015 (The Times of India, 2015). 
Although Bhindranwale had already become one of the central religious figures in the 
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community by this time, control over the SGPC would have also provided him with 
significant economic power. 
The Sikh preacher’s support base was generated as a result of the uneven 
development trajectory of the Green Revolution, which unequivocally benefitted the Sikh 
bourgeoisie (Brown, 1996: 155). Whereas Bhindranwale originated from the prosperous 
province of Malwa, Telford (1992: 976) maintains that his band of armed militants 
predominantly came from large, and relatively impoverished, Jat families in the Majha 
region. Rapid socioeconomic changes in the agricultural sectors of the bordering 
Gurdaspur and Amritsar areas of the Majha, had facilitated the pauperization of peasants 
with marginal landholdings (Singh, 1984: 43). Since alternate employment avenues were 
not available in the industrial sector, many peasants became landless, while others were 
subjected to conditions of chronic unemployment.  
Prior to the implementation of the Nehruvian model of modernization, and the 
proliferation of agribusiness within the region of Punjab, the rural peasantry in these 
areas was self-sufficient and cohesive despite ethno-linguistic, cultural, and religious 
differences (Misra, 1995: 137). Though class and caste inequalities existed, a significant 
proportion of Punjabi families were able to maintain an adequate standard of living 
(Klein, 2009: 91). Even the Dalits and Mahzabis were able to achieve sufficient 
nutritional sustenance from religious shrines, like the Sikh gurdwara (temple), which 
instituted free communal kitchens. Following the inception of technologically intensive 
farming practices in Punjab, communal relations deteriorated, and social inequality 
increased drastically.  
Mechanization, agro-chemicals, and hybridized seeds permitted higher cropping 
intensity however, famine, irrigation issues, and high debt burdens began to 
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disproportionally affect small landowners (Randhawa, 1975: 71). Thus, while the 
dominant Jat landlords were able to capitalize on technological innovation and accrue 
vast amounts of profit, smaller Sikh farmers were forcefully dispelled from their ancestral 
lands. The imbalanced experiences of the Green Revolution resulted in considerable 
political polarization in Punjab politics. For a short period of time, Jat peasants with small 
landholdings, and others who did not directly benefit from the Green Revolution, became 
aware of their objective position in relations of production.  
Support for the Marxist branch of the Bharatiya Communist Party radically 
increased in Punjab’s legislative assembly elections following capitalist modernization 
(Tatla, 1999: 18). The Naxalite movement was also born in this opportune economic, 
social, and political climate. Nonetheless, the cultivation of a genuine class consciousness 
amongst Punjab’s agrarian peasantry was short-lived. Instead of making lasting economic 
links with Hindu peasants, or the landless Dalits and Mahzabis, small Jat landowners 
rallied around the fervently anti-communist Bhindranwale. The Sikh leader not only 
blamed the SAD and the INC for the plight of Punjab’s downtrodden farmers, he also 
provided copious amounts of religious opiates to the hungry, landless, and impoverished 
(Singh, 1984: 44). 
Initially, young Jat males from the AISSF joined Bhindranwale since they 
perceived allegiance to him as a form of Panthic sewa (community service). However, 
militancy began to represent an economically sound ‘career opportunity’ for Sikhs that 
belonged to lower-castes, and others who were unemployed, and propertyless (Telford, 
1992: 986). When the activities of the pro-Khalistani factions eventually degenerated into 
extortion, kidnapping, and mass murder, Bal (2005: 3981) indicates that “…the socio-
economic conditions of the families of militants improved dramatically… they purchased 
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agricultural land…built palatial houses, purchased vehicles, trucks and tractors”. By this 
time, terrorist violence in the countryside had forced many average Sikh civilians to 
withdraw social, moral, and economic support to the militant outfits (Chopra, 2012: 43). 
Nevertheless, following the infiltration of the sacred Harmandir Sahib Complex, 
Bhindranwale gained the status of a ‘martyr’, and thousands of young men joined the 
‘holy war’ against the Indian government. The Khalistani ethno-nationalist movement 
also gained considerable support among diasporic Sikhs.     
SECTION IV: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN THE CANADIAN SIKH 
DIASPORA 
Shifting Nationalist Loyalties and the Air India Tragedy: 
More than three decades have passed since the Indian Army’s attack on the 
Harmandir Sahib Complex, but time has failed to heal the deep-seated wounds produced 
by the climate of political opportunism, ethnic entrepreneurship, and inter-communal 
violence which plagued post-independence Punjab. For Sikh communities’ settled 
overseas, nationalist loyalties with Bharat Mata were severed following the execution of 
Operation Blue Star, and the anti-Sikh pogroms that took place after the political 
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In Canada, the vast majority of Sikh 
immigrants had not identified with the imagined homeland of Khalistan, let alone 
supported efforts to achieve secession from India.  
Nevertheless, Tatla (1999: 203; emphasis added) notes that the critical event at 
the Golden Temple “…brought home a new feeling of endangered and collective fate of 
the community scattered in many countries”. When images of the carnage at the 
Harmandir Sahib Complex were circulated by the mainstream Canadian press, Sikhs 
congregated in gurdwaras (temples) to lament the sacrilege of the community’s holiest 
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site of pilgrimage, and to mourn the loss of innocent life on a holy day. Four months 
later, when news of the Ghallughara reached the diaspora, sentiments of grief transmuted 
into cries for vengeance, holy war, and martyrdom.  
On June 23rd 1985, Air India Flight-182 disintegrated over Irish Seas due to the 
midair detonation of a concealed bomb that had been loaded in the cargo hold of the 
Boeing 747 commercial airliner (Fitzgerald, 2011: 357). Out of the 329 passengers that 
were killed during the in-flight explosion, 278 were confirmed to be Canadian citizens 
(Bellarsi and Maufort, 2002: 98). Insurgents identifying with the international Babbar 
Khalsa outfit were deemed responsible for the bombing plot, and Canada was 
subsequently identified as a safe haven for Sikh extremists (Hoffman and Reinares, 2014: 
144). Although the alleged perpetrators were eventually apprehended by law enforcement 
officials, they were exonerated due to inadequate evidence following one of the longest, 
and most expensive, criminal trials in Canadian history (Tatla, 2014: 508). The Air India 
Flight-182 tragedy affirmed that, as opposed to disappearing, the Khalistani ethno-
nationalist movement had matured, and became intensified in the Canadian diasporic 
setting.  
Today, Canada has become home to the one of the fastest growing Sikh 
populations outside of the contested homeland (Nesbitt, 2016: 3). From abroad, Sikh 
immigrants, and their Canadian-born descendants, have provided ideological coherency 
to the violent separatist movement, as well as economic and moral support to pro-
Khalistani factions geographically situated in India and Pakistan (Guidry, Kennedy, and 
Zald, 2000: 329).Whereas the Indian government judiciously sidelined long-standing 
Sikh resentment against the ‘secular’ nation-state, and violently repressed insurgency 
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efforts, the favorable political climate in Canada has allowed the community to pursue its 
dream of homeland in a predominantly democratic fashion.  
Unpleasant Truths and Comforting Lies: The Reality of Canada’s ‘Cultural Mosaic’ 
Sympathizers of the nationalist, political liberation movement remain 
concentrated within institutionally complete ethnic enclaves like ‘Singhdale’ and Surrey, 
where Sikhs reside in large numbers (Pitter and Lorinc, 2016; Nayar, 2004). Though 
these areas have received considerable attention in media reports, ethnic enclaves are not 
unique to the Sikh experience in Canada. Many well-established immigrant communities 
have managed partially to recreate elements of the old-country within major Canadian 
cities. Chinatown, Little Italy and Greektown are clear examples of the changing socio-
cultural landscape of contemporary Canadian society.  
Simmons (2010: 165) suggests that the clustering and clumping of ethno-cultural, 
or religious groups, within small geographic areas is non-random. Residential settlement 
patterns reveal that a significant proportion of immigrants voluntarily choose to live 
around their own kind - people that resemble them phenotypically, or share cultural, 
linguistic, or other similarities (Goering, 2007: 108). Although class position and 
economic resources ultimately dictate the quality of housing that is available to 
individuals or families in Canada, the existence of ethnic enclaves still speaks to the 
primordial ideas of home and belonging. The presence of familiar places, faces, foods, 
and music not only allow predictability, but they also provide a sense of security for 
members of diasporic groups that are settled in a foreign land. 
While remaining committed to the struggle for Khalistan, members of the Sikh 
diaspora have attempted to create the familiar in an unfamiliar setting. In the Greater 
Vancouver, and Greater Toronto Area (GTA), community members have organized 
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large-scale nagar kirtans (parades) to commemorate the ‘martyrdom’ of Bhindranwale, 
and the ‘sacrifices’ made for the quam by other Khalistani insurgents. In the past, Parmar, 
the alleged mastermind of the Flight-182 tragedy, has been among those garlanded during 
the annual religious processions (Barlow, 2015: 98). Overt cultural demonstrations like 
the nagar kirtan attest that the Sikhs, like other major ethno-cultural and religious 
communities in Canada, have generally rejected cultural assimilation in favour of 
accommodation within the host country (Gibson, 1988: 24).  
Officially, this adaptation pattern has been supported by the Canadian 
government’s commitment to inclusive citizenship which remains enshrined in the 
official policy of multiculturalism. Yet, empirical realities reveal that some Canadians are 
not equally as welcome to participate in the ‘cultural mosaic’ as others. The history of 
Sikh migration and settlement within Canada is replete with implicit and explicit racial 
discrimination, as well as profound economic exploitation. Akin to other visible minority 
groups, the Sikhs were considered to be undesirable immigrants since their unfamiliar 
cultural practices had the potential to rupture the delicate fabric of Canadian society, and 
consequently threaten social stability (Singh, 2014: 527).  
Exclusionary laws like the Continuous Journey Regulation were devised and 
implemented in order to preserve the nation’s ethnic and racial integrity. One of the first 
challenges to Canada’s xenophobic policy regime was posed by a group of Sikh 
immigrants that arrived in the Vancouver harbor chartering the Japanese streamliner, the 
Komagata Maru (Johnston, 2014: 9). These Sikhs unsuccessfully defied immigration 
restrictions which granted free right of entry almost exclusively to Anglo immigrants, and 
restricted admission to the socially, culturally, and morally ‘inferior’ Plinian races. The 
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Komagata Maru incident represents one of the many disgraceful blots in Canadian 
history.  
Discriminatory immigration policies were only amended due to shortages in 
labour that arose when Canada ceased to represent an attractive destination for white 
immigrants from Europe and America (Westhues, 2006: 355). Racialized labour was 
subsequently imported from periphery countries like China and India under restrictive 
quotas (Galabuzi, 2006: 79). The Sikhs, like most racial and ethnic ‘others’ that arrived in 
Canada, were forced to work for lower wages than their native-born counterparts 
(Hickman, 2014: 36). Moreover, they were ghettoized in the least desirable job sectors, 
and often compelled to work under substandard employment conditions (Nayar, 2004: 
16). In addition to enduring conditions of profound economic exploitation at the hands of 
their employers, early Sikh immigrants were routinely subjected to racially-motivated 
aggression due to their distinctive physical appearance (Seiple, Hoover, and Otis, 2013: 
90).  
Considering that economic opportunities were more readily available in Canada 
than in their country of origin, most Sikh immigrants accepted the systemic racism, 
ridicule and social segregation they were forced to confront within the host society. 
Nevertheless, since neither the government, nor native-born population made an 
emotional commitment to the community, most Sikhs remained in Canada exclusively to 
make an economic living (Berry and Henderson, 2002: 72). Due to the peasant origins of 
the pioneer Sikhs, most amassed capital with the dream of returning home and procuring 
land in their ancestral villages which they considered to be a sign of prosperity and 
success (Tatla, 1999: 64). A large proportion of their earnings were also remitted to 
support dependents that were left behind. Until the eve of Operation Blue Star, the 
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majority of Sikh immigrants perceived themselves to be temporary settlers in a foreign, 
and alien land.  
 Though racial equality has vastly improved since the elimination of Canada’s 
overt colour bar immigration policies, Sikhs continue to endure discrimination and 
xenophobic attitudes from the native-born population, as well as members of other visible 
minority groups. For baptized, orthodox Sikhs, who adorn the five external symbols of 
the Khalsa Panth, integration into the host society has proven to be exceptionally 
difficult. Following the deadly September 11th terror attacks on the World Trade Center, 
and recent spate of Islamic extremism in Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia, a 
sharp rise in hate crimes has been documented against members of overseas Sikh 
communities (Zanetti et al, 2014: 129). In the United States, confused and unintelligent 
Islamophobes have violently assaulted Sikhs and vandalized their places of worship 
under the mistaken assumption that they resemble the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.  
Even though Sikhs and Muslims belong to entirely different faiths, Orientalized 
depictions of ‘Arabs’ in the Western media continue to generate suspicion and mistrust of 
those with turbans, unshorn beards, distinctive cultural apparel, and brown skin. In the 
United States, Sikhs have become collateral damage in the lucrative war on terror, and 
the ideological project of terror racialization which has been undertaken by national 
security agencies and the entertainment media. In the wake of the deadly Oak Creek 
shooting rampage, overseas Sikh communities have become more aware of their 
vulnerable status in the post-9/11 world. In the Canadian context, violent victimization 
against Sikhs has also been reported, but at a comparatively lower incidence than in the 
United States (Nahon-Serfaty, 2014: 55).  
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Intergenerational Conflict and Cultural Inbetweenity: 
Studies of immigrant experiences and adaptation patterns carry the risk of over-
generalization, but there is evidence which suggests that norms of racism and cultural 
chauvinism also operate within the Sikh diaspora. In the migration literature, social 
scientists have used rates of intermarriage “…as a measure of decreasing social distance, 
declining prejudice, and changing group boundaries” (Lee and Bean, 2007: 382). Even 
though mixed unions have become more prevalent in Canada over the past several 
decades, the marital alliances of Sikhs continue to be organized around principles of caste 
endogamy, and clan exogamy (Partridge, 2005: 234). While a racialized hierarchy of 
dating preferences obviously exists among members of the native-born population, 
interethnic and interracial marriages with ‘outsiders’ are strongly discouraged in Sikh 
families, and prohibited by priests in highly orthodox gurdwaras (Rait, 2005: 162).  
Since members of ethnic communities feel primordial affinities with their own 
‘kind’, and considering that insecurity is biogenetically coded in humans, marriages with 
perceived outsiders may generate feelings of apprehension, angst, and exposure 
especially among religious leaders and older immigrants. Consequently, as in the old 
country, family izzat (honour) must be taken into careful consideration when selecting 
partners for dating and mating since certain boundaries are non-traversable even in the 
diasporic setting. Traditionalism is especially prevalent in strict orthodox Sikh families 
who geographically reside in Canada, but live their daily lives according to static ideas, 
norms, and values of Punjab.  
Within the diaspora, young Sikh women disproportionately bear the burden of 
family izzat since they are required to police their plutonic and intimate relationships in 
accordance with the community’s double standard of sexuality (Nayar, 2004: 101). In 
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some extreme Canadian cases, familial opposition to intermarriage has resulted in 
instances of brutal retaliation against Sikh women in the form of honour killings. 
Considering that these types of homicides are typically sanctioned or executed by the 
patriarch, or another high-status male figure within the family, a certain level of 
machismo is also present among Canadian diasporic Sikhs (Jakobsh, 2010; Warner, 
2012; Kanwar, 2015). Though this contention goes beyond the scope of the present paper, 
it is important to note that gender is a perceptible source of division within the imagined 
Sikh community.  
Sociologically, the Sikh community’s cultural and sexual chauvinism may be 
explained by the profound cultural strains which are produced during the interrelated 
processes of resettlement and acculturation. Like their co-ethnics in Punjab, diasporic 
Sikhs choose to live in close proximity with their relatives and maintain close-knit, 
multigenerational family units (Ballantyne, 2006: 162). Even in the most foreign and 
unwelcoming land, these types of household arrangements can provide immigrants with 
support, safety, and predictability. Berkman and D'Ambruoso (2006: 207) acknowledge 
that traditional Sikh family life can provide social and economic anchorage, but they 
argue that cultural incongruence in multigenerational households can also lead to conflict. 
A wide body of scholarly literature substantiates that assimilation can generate conflict 
and threaten intimate consanguine relationships between descendants of immigrants and 
their families (Sachleben, 2014; Hawley, 2013; Orozco, Orozco, and Qin-Hilliard, 2012).   
Social and economic resources, place of birth, and generation status determine the 
way in which experiences of physical uprooting and cultural dislocation are managed by 
diasporic Sikhs. Since first-generation Sikh immigrants are usually unwilling and unable 
to integrate into the Canadian mainstream, the norms and values of the country of origin 
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will often take precedence over that of the host society (Jhutti-Johal, 2011: 159). 
However, cultural assimilation becomes more likely over multiple generations due to the 
fact that the children, and grandchildren, of immigrants become exposed to schools, peer 
groups, and other agents of socialization in the destination country (Jule, 2003: 61). 
Hostilities may arise between members of the same household when younger generations 
reject the identity and culture of ‘home’ in favour of more Westernized alternatives. 
The existence of intergenerational conflict indicates that the Sikh community in 
Canada is in a state of transition. Today, second and third-generation diasporic Sikhs are 
critically challenging norms of traditionalism, and religious orthodoxy which their 
parents expect them to blindly adhere to. Contestation is only one of the novel responses 
that Canadian-born Sikhs have developed in response to the problem of cultural 
“inbetweenity”. Prevalent among descendants of immigrants, inbetweenity refers to the 
emotional strain that is produced when individuals are forced to confront and adapt to 
oppositional cultural formations (Ratele and Duncan, 2003: 124). While a small minority 
have completely embraced the symbolic and spiritual insignias of the Khalsa 
brotherhood, others have actively distanced themselves from the faith to maximize their 
possibility of assimilation, and acceptance into the Canadian mainstream.  
Rejecting both outright assimilation and regressive resegregation, the vast 
majority of Sikh youth have attempted to strike a delicate balance between the two 
irreconcilable, and often contradictory worlds they find themselves trapped between 
(Sachleben, 2014: 90). Part of the growing number of Canadians who have assumed 
hyphenated identities, these Sikh-Canadians (alternatively Punjabi-Canadians or Indo-
Canadians) are collectively forging a new creolized culture which bears little 
resemblance to that of Punjab, or the adoptive country. Today, most Sikh-Canadians do 
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not keep their kesh (uncut hair), and many others live at total odds with the ‘pure’ way of 
life that is outlined in the Adi Granth. Considering that Mona (clean-shaven) and 
Sehajdari (Sikh Deism) identities have become more common in the diaspora, religious 
prohibitions against pre-marital sex, tobacco usage, and alcohol consumption are not 
strictly observed (Morjaria-Keval and Keval, 2015: 124).  
Studies have found that problem drinking is widespread in many overseas Sikh 
communities (Cochrane, 1990; Sian, 2013). Lindrage, Dhillon, and Shah discovered that 
second-generation British-Sikhs mitigated the tension of cultural inbetweenity by 
rejecting both Punjabi and English values, while simultaneously creating an identity 
exclusively around alcoholism (Quoted in Jamal et al., 2015: 246). The changing subject 
matter of Punjabi folk music provides anecdotal support for the emergence of a 
distinctively Sikh drinking culture. Shifting societal norms, and large-scale changes in 
aesthetic preferences, have facilitated the popularization of songs like “ghar di sharab” 
(homemade liquor or moonshine), “Patiala peg” (triple shot), and “daru pee ke” (after 
drinking alcohol). Like their British-born counterparts, many Canadian-Sikhs do not 
observe religiously based restrictions against alcohol consumption. Recently, the 
manufacturers of Johnnie Walker nationally recognized residents of ‘Singhdale’ for their 
unparalleled fondness of Scotch whisky (Brampton Guardian, 2012). 
 Under his program of religious revivalism, Bhindranwale had attempted to 
eradicate evils like alcoholism which became prevalent among the Sikhs of Punjab in the 
wake of rural modernization. During puritanical sermons, the militant revolutionary 
frequently emasculated Sikh males who did not wear turbans, and vilified non-orthodox 
members of the community as equivalent to the Hindu enemy (Harley, 2009; Hume, 
2013). At the zenith of his proselytizing crusade, Bhindranwale proffered a rhetorical 
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final solution to deal with Sikhs of lax faith: “[i]f I had my way, you know what I would 
do to all these Sardars who drink whisky-shisky every evening? I would douse them in 
kerosene oil and set fire to the bloody lot” (Quoted in Fernandes, 2011: 91).  
Despite the fact that a significant proportion of Sikh-Canadians engage in one or 
more of the depravities prohibited by the Adi Granth, many continue to blindly support 
Bhindranwale, and glorify religious violence committed in the name of the Khalsa Panth 
(Kaminsky and Long, 2011: 632). These perceptible contradictions allude to the 
importance of narrative history for identity formation. Within the diaspora, the identity of 
many second and third-generation Sikh youth has been built upon a highly selective, and 
deeply emotive, episodic history of oppression, genocide, and martyrdom. The collective 
grief of the community has been enough to produce fictionalized ideas of ‘home’ among 
Canadian-Sikhs who remain willfully ignorant of the events leading up to the attack on 
the Harmandir Sahib Complex, and the politics of the Punjab problem. 
Remember and Forgetting: Prerequisites for Instituting the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat  
The desire for belonging, and the longing for home, has led to romanticized ideas 
about Khalistan among members of the Canadian Sikh diaspora. Even though identity 
formation and transformation are complex processes, identification with non-rational, 
non-class-based markers may be attributable to the need for in-group solidarity which 
arises as a consequence of perceived vulnerability in the receiving society (Hawley, 
1993: 38). In the short-term, elevated levels of ethnic consciousness and solidarity may 
be conducive to managing the pervasive problems of racism and discrimination many 
immigrant communities encounter overseas. For minority group members attempting to 
consolidate their positions within unfamiliar lands, chances for economic survival may be 
maximized by remaining true to their own ‘kind’. In the long-term, however, retreat into 
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religio-cultural exclusivity is neither a practical, nor sensible decision given that racial, 
ethnic, and religious communities do not constitute homogenous groups.  
As with the Sikh population of Punjab, perceptible caste and class-based 
cleavages exist between members of the Canadian Sikh diaspora. Perplexingly, as a 
religious ideology, Sikhism is devoid of caste stratification (Jodhka, 2014: 585). Yet, 
notions of caste purity and pollution continue to permeate all aspects of social, political 
and religious life for members of the diaspora. The divisiveness of the imagined 
community is perhaps most perceptible when examined in relation to the organization, 
and political management of Canadian gurdwaras. In the diasporic setting, Sikh places of 
worship are primarily controlled by the two largest and most dominant caste groups; the 
Jats and Ramgarhias (Singh, 1984: 42).  
For the devout, gurdwaras represent a critical site “…from which one seeks divine 
knowledge, spiritual guidance, bliss and peace of mind and soul” (Sikh Cultural Society 
of Great Britain, 1993: 19). Yet, within the institutionally complete communities of 
‘Singhdale’ and Surrey, violent power struggles have routinely erupted inside these 
places of worship (Nayar, 2004; The Toronto Star, 2010). Considering that gurdwara 
management committees receive large amounts of cash in donations from members of 
their congregation, there is speculation that intra-ethnic violence may have underlying 
material and economic origins.   
The Ontario Khalsa Darbar (OKD), one of the largest Sikh temples in Canada, has 
made national headlines on several occasions for allegations of corruption, and 
mismanagement of funds. In 2006, a small faction of the gurdwara’s committee members 
took the financial directors of OKD to court for failing to account for nearly three million 
dollars in membership fees (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2007). The matter, which 
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remains unresolved a decade later, has not deterred members of the congregation from 
donating their hard-earned wages to the controversial temple.  
Based on registered charity information submitted to Revenue Canada during the 
2015 tax period, OKD reported an annual revenue of $1,988,204, and $13,834,598 in 
total assets (Canada Revenue Agency, 2015). Due to the strong presence of the Sikh-
centric ethnic media in the GTA, members of the diaspora have at least minimal 
knowledge of the scandals, and problematic tendencies developing in their places of 
worship. Yet, most Sikhs tend to disregard instances of financial mismanagement as 
isolated occurrences, and fail to acknowledge the pervasive programs of ethnic, and 
religious entrepreneurship being pursued by elites within their community. 
Like other segments of the Canadian population, many diasporic Sikhs have put 
aside rational understandings of class, and embraced the irrational elements of their 
ethno-religious identities. As a whole however, Canadians seem to be aware that social 
inequality exists, and that it has widened over the past several decades (Raphael, 2011; 
92). Still, the vast majority possess either conservative, or highly ambivalent attitudes 
towards social change. Canadians rarely, if ever, actively organize in order to remedy 
their class-based grievances. Trotsky famously suggested that “…the mere existence of 
privations is not enough to cause an insurrection, if it were, the masses would always be 
in revolt” (Quoted in Swingewood, 1975: 129).  
In Canada, attention is drawn away from the social disorders of the political-
economic system by way of elaborate political distraction, and incessant mass media 
manipulation. For nearly a decade, the outgoing administration managed widening 
economic inequalities by removing class terminology from political discourse. Justifying 
the politics of erasure pursued by the Conservative party, ex-Prime Minister Stephen 
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Harper suggested: “[w]e don’t believe in the politics of division and so-called class 
warfare” (Quoted in Freeman, 2015; emphasis added). Parallels can be drawn between 
Harper’s tactics and that of the ruling Party in Orwell’s dystopic novel “Nineteen Eighty-
Four”.  
In the book, the official language of the totalitarian regime is designed to diminish 
the capacity for critical thought. As opposed to incorporating new words in to Newspeak, 
the Party actively sought to reduce the number of words its citizens could use. Enos 
(2013: 198) explains that this task was undertaken by the Party so that it “…would make 
it impossible for an individual even to have an idea in opposition to any government 
position, insofar as thought is dependent on words”. Like Big Brother, transnational 
capitalist elites have a stake in removing class terminology from political discourse. For 
without the conception of class, there can be no collective working-class consciousness, 
and consequently no opportunity for revolutionary social change. 
Today, while the vast majority of Canadians belong to the working-class in 
objective terms, most fail subjectively to recognize that their collective interests are 
juxtaposed to capital. Ironically, even though a highly polarized society has emerged, 
capitalism continues to be extolled as virtuous and egalitarian by some of the most 
disenfranchised and underprivileged populations. This anomaly may be attributable to the 
fact that Canadians are taught to explain, and even justify, the persistence of class-based 
inequalities individualistically, as opposed to structurally. While structural explanations 
shed light on inequality as a public issue, individualistic explanations presume that it is 
nothing more than a personal trouble (Mills, 1959: 3).  
Members of the lay public tend to apply individualistic explanations in order to 
rationalize social stratification. These explanations tend to emphasize attributes that 
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individuals possess or lack, to explain why some people are more predisposed to 
conditions of material deprivation than others. Poverty is assumed to be a consequence of 
factors like individual laziness, lack of motivation or perhaps even cultural beliefs. From 
a sociological perspective, the individualistic explanation is deficient since it amounts to 
nothing more than victim-blaming. In contrast, structural explanations of inequality take 
into consideration the vast matrix of domination which persistently structures 
opportunities for the few, at the cost to the many. This approach effectively diverts blame 
from the individual to the political-economic system. The supreme manifestation of the 
victim-blaming discourse is the ideology of meritocracy which has been manufactured by 
transnational elites, and profusely disseminated by the political puppets of capital: the 
‘democratically’ elected representatives of the nation-state.  
Recently, news of the appointment of four Sikh cabinet ministers was widely 
circulated by domestic, and international media outlets. Sikhs, who had been the targets 
of state-sanctioned genocidal pogroms in India, had been actively incorporated into the 
Canadian political establishment. Symbolically, the new cabinet configuration provided a 
sense of legitimacy to members of the imagined community that were geographically 
dispersed across different parts of the globe. The collective sentiment of diasporic Sikhs 
was captured by a headline published in the Toronto Star: “we have arrived” (Woods, 
2015: emphasis added). Despite evidence of class, caste, and gender divisions within the 
diaspora, many Sikhs still understood the cabinet appointments as community 
achievements, as opposed to individual accomplishments. Since their countrymen had 
been given a voice in the direction of their adoptive country, diasporic Sikhs felt that their 
interests would also be represented. 
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Considering that governments do not really govern in capitalist societies, this 
political arrangement can be understood as an elaborate attempt to appease ethnic voters, 
and maintain social stability (Allahar and Côté, 1998: 8). Sensationalized press coverage 
of upwardly-mobile Sikh immigrants not only perpetuates the illusory model minority 
stereotype, but it also selectively glosses over the fact that most members of the imagined 
community are far from affluent (Basran and Bolaria, 2004: 186). Though national data 
are not specifically collected on the employment trends of Sikhs, general extrapolations 
can be made from the labour force profiles of Canadians with East Indian origins.  
According to Statistics Canada (2007: 7), East Indians are more than twice as 
likely to be employed in the declining manufacturing sector than any other group. 
Moreover, in comparison to other racial and ethnic groups, East Indians are more 
susceptible to conditions of unemployment and material deprivation. These trends are 
surprising considering that, when compared to other Canadian adults, a relatively larger 
proportion of East Indians hold a post- secondary college or university degree (Statistics 
Canada, 2007: 7).  
The anomalous labour market profiles of East Indians not only dispel meritocracy 
as illusory, they also draw support for the vertical mosaic hypothesis. Like all other 
capitalist societies, Canada remains stratified on the basis of race, ethnicity, and social 
class (Porter, 2015; 73). In spite of the fact that wage stagnation and employment 
precarity have become common place for Sikhs, and many other working-class 
Canadians, the government recently issued a pay hike to cabinet ministers which brought 
their annual salaries up to $170,400 (Parliament of Canada, 2016). The celebration of 
symbolic victories, and elevated ethnic consciousness of diasporic Sikhs, must be 
contextualized in light of these contradictions. Today, primordial affinities continue to 
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distract many Punjabi-Sikhs from realizing the class interests which they share in 
common with most other Canadians.  
Members of the native-born population may have material interests in common 
with immigrant populations, but many still perceive the changing face of Canada to be a 
real threat to the status-quo. Immigration Watch, a White nationalist group that has 
previously been investigated for the distribution of racist flyers in ‘Singhdale’, recently 
demanded an apology from the Canadian government for its continued support of “Sikh 
invasion” and white genocide (Brampton Guardian, 2015). Historically, racialized 
immigrant communities have been blamed for the economic, social, and political 
contradictions produced by neoliberal policies, and the endemic crises of global 
capitalism.  
Anti-immigrant sentiments become especially pronounced during periods of bust 
when competition increases over scarce resources and jobs. Bonacich (1972: 547) 
corroborates that ethnic antagonism often arises from split labour markets which are 
typified by a three-way competition between capital, and two opposing ethnic or racial 
groups which are in competition for the same jobs, but differ fundamentally on the price 
they expect to be paid for their labour. Considering that the goal of all businesses is to 
accumulate maximal profit at minimal cost, cheaper labour will always displace higher 
priced labour when these types of conflicts occur.  
In comparison to the embourgeoised proletariat of the affluent society, 
immigrants represent a highly exploitable, cheap, and docile labour force since conditions 
of uncertainty in the destination country place many under the compulsion of the whip of 
hunger (Allahar and Hick, 2011: 3). The vulnerable status of immigrants, which forces 
them to accept jobs at lower wages, also generates resentment among members of the 
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higher price, native-born labour group. When a price differential becomes present, white 
workers may espouse racist ideologies, or even resort to violence to protect their material 
interests. In this context, racism is instrumental and may be interpreted as a rational short-
term decision on the part of a native-born white worker. By minimizing competition, 
racism allows the higher price labour group to retain their jobs and secure a wage from 
the capitalist class. However, in the long-term, this tactic endangers the entire working-
class movement.  
White workers perpetuate hate as response to perceived job ‘theft’ and wage 
undercutting, but they fail to realize that immigrants are used to “…regulate class conflict 
directly by undercutting the collective actions launched by domestic worker 
organizations, and indirectly by diverting the class hostilities rooted in the economy onto 
alien scapegoats” (Basran and Bolaria, 2004: 82). Thus, as opposed to the hyper-
exploited racial and ethnic ‘others’ who make up the industrial reserve army of labour, 
the white workers’ real enemy is the bourgeoisie. Consequently, whenever workers from 
the core countries use prejudice and racially motivated violence against their comrades 
who originate from the periphery, they are behaving in a falsely conscious manner, even 
if they are successful in supplanting them to protect their jobs. Today, trivial ethno-racial 
divisions fragment the labour movement by preventing the masses from developing a 
genuine class consciousness, and achieving their true revolutionary potential.   
While native-born workers, visible minorities, women, gays, and other 
historically marginalized populations hierarchize the importance of various oppressions, 
and pursue efforts to retribalize and resegregate, the material conditions of capitalism – 
which allow the few to rule and keep the vast majority subordinate – remain unscathed. 
Considering that the struggle for human emancipation is intrinsically tied up with a 
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growing need for solidarity, identity politics is unconducive to progressive social change. 
Yet, under the larger project of revolutionary class struggle, racial, gender, and sexual 
antagonisms can be redressed, and eventually eradicated. In order to abolish private 
property, and achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat, oppressed groups must be 
prepared to engage in the politics of remembering and forgetting. Now more than ever, 
the similarities people share as global citizens must be selectively recalled, whereas 
trivial differences must be consigned to oblivion. 
Nonetheless, the political acts of remembering and forgetting are intrinsically tied 
up with power and privilege (Allahar, 2011: 73). As aptly conveyed by Allahar (2011: 
75), “…history is a bundle of silences…those who have power to construct the past 
normally have power to order the present”. For ethno-religious groups like the Sikhs, 
overlooking the role of the state in ethnic cleansing and extra-judicial punishment is a 
painful experience. While these historical realities should not be forgotten, myths of 
common descent, heroic ancestries and chosen people, problematize any possibility of 
revolutionary class consciousness. Even though primordial identities are capable of 
evoking feelings of belonging sometimes as intense as consanguineal bonds, they can 
also ideologically distract people from the structural causes of subjugation.  
SECTION V: CONCLUSION  
This paper presented a conceptual sociological analysis of the diasporic politics of 
identity and homeland. While acknowledging the limitations associated with economic 
determinism, this paper demonstrated that ethno-racial markers of identity, and 
primordial religious mythologies, can be politically employed to distract members of 
oppressed groups from realizing the material conditions which perpetuate inequality in 
post-colonial societies. From the very outset, the imagined Sikh community’s 
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independence struggle has been rooted in stark class, and caste-based, power differentials 
which have been generated by the political-economic contradictions of peripheral 
capitalist development.  
Since the culmination of the insurgency period, the state of Punjab became 
plagued by conditions of abject poverty which forced farmers to commit suicide in the 
thousands (Bourne, 2015: 56). Despite the fact that the misery of the agrarian peasantry is 
intrinsically related to the intensification of globalization, and capitalist modernization, 
revolution seems unlikely. Romanticized visions of Khalistan have also become 
emotively embedded in the hearts and minds of many second and third-generation 
diasporic youth beyond the land five rivers. Perplexingly, while newer generations of 
Canadian-Sikhs support the imagined theocratic state of Khalistan, they selectively 
disregard the righteous way of life envisioned by the founders of the Khalsa Panth, and 
dismiss the spiritual guidance proffered in the Adi Granth. In both the core, and periphery 
countries, human emancipation necessitates a collective sense of forgetfulness and 
solidarity which remain at odds with the modern politics of identity. 
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